On the privacy of a code-based single-server computational PIR scheme by Bordage, Sarah & Lavauzelle, Julien
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
00
50
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 A
pr
 20
20
On the privacy of a code-based single-server
computational PIR scheme
Sarah Bordage∗ Julien Lavauzelle†
April 2, 2020
Abstract
We show that the single-server computational PIR protocol proposed by Holzbaur, Hol-
lanti and Wachter-Zeh in [HHW20] is not private, in the sense that the server can recover in
polynomial time the index of the desired file with very high probability. The attack relies on
the following observation. Removing rows of the query matrix corresponding to the desired
file yields a large decrease of the dimension over Fq of the vector space spanned by the rows
of this punctured matrix. Such a dimension loss only shows up with negligible probability
when rows unrelated to the requested file are deleted.
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) enables a user to retrieve an entry of a database without
revealing to the storage system the identity of the requested entry. Two security models have
been introduced for PIR schemes. First, the seminal work of Chor et al. [CGKS95] proposes
information-theoretical security, in the sense that absolutely no information leaks about the
identity of the desired item. A trivial solution, commonly referred as the trivial PIR scheme, is to
require the storage system to send the whole database to the user. As a matter of fact, the authors
of [CGKS95] also proved that, in the single-server information theoretic setting, one cannot
expect to achieve communication complexity better than the trivial solution. The second security
model circumvents this limit and allows the more practical use of a single server by relaxing
the privacy requirement. In this model, the storage system is assumed to be computationally
bounded: informally, recovering the identity of the desired item must require an attacker to
invest unreachable computational effort. So-called computationally private information retrieval
(cPIR) was firstly introduced in [CG97,KO97], and subsequent constructions [CMS99,YKPB13,
GR05, KLL+15, LP17] were then proposed. Aguilar et al. proved the potential practicality of
cPIR [AMBFK16], but the question of building efficient cPIR protocols remains widely open.
Indeed, the computational complexity of existing cPIR schemes is the most important barriers
to implementation.
In this paper we focus on the recent single-server cPIR protocol proposed by Holzbaur, Hollanti
and Wachter-Zeh in [HHW20], which relies on computational assumptions in coding theory.
We prove that this scheme is not private: we present an algorithm which recovers the identity
of the file in polynomial time and with very high probability, when given as input the query
produced by the user. We implemented our attack, which runs in a few minutes on a standard
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laptop. The attack requires the number of files stored in the database to be large enough, namely
lower-bounded by some function of the scheme parameters. It turns out that this condition is
fulfilled for meaningful parameters of the scheme. Indeed, we show that if this lower bound is
not satisfied, then the communication complexity of the cPIR scheme gets very close to the one
of the trivial PIR protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the scheme proposed in [HHW20].
The attack is presented and proved in Section 3 and followed by a short discussion.
2 Description of the cPIR scheme proposed in [HHW20]
In this section, we briefly describe the PIR scheme proposed in [HHW20].
2.1 Notation and definitions
Let us denote [a, b] := {a, a+1, . . . , b} and Fq the finite field with q elements. The extension field
Fqs is also a vector space of dimension s over Fq. If Γ = {γ1, . . . , γv} ⊂ Fqs is a family of linearly
independent vectors over Fq, then we denote 〈γ1, . . . , γv〉Fq ⊆ Fqs the vector space of dimension
v over Fq which is generated by the elements in Γ. We also define ψΓ : Fqs → 〈γ1, . . . , γv〉Fq the
corresponding projection map.
For a vector x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ Ftqs and an ordered subset J ⊂ [1, n] of size t, we denote
φJ (x) ∈ F
n
q the extension of the vector x with zeroes at indices j /∈ J . For instance, if
n = 5 and J = {1, 4}, then φ{1,4}((x1, x2)) = (x1, 0, 0, x2, 0). This map is extended to matrices
by applying φJ row-wise. Conversely, if x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnqs , the punctured vector xJ is
xJ := (xj1 , . . . , xjt) ∈ F
t
qs . For a subset A ⊂ F
n
qs , one writes AJ := {aJ | a ∈ A}.
Given a linear code C ⊆ Fnqs of dimension k, an information set for C is a subset I ⊂ [1, n] of
size k such that CI = Fkqs . Finally, given a matrix M ∈ F
r×n
qs , we define the rank over Fq of M ,
denoted rkFq(M), as the dimension over Fq of the vector space generated by the rows of M .
Notice that rkFq(M) ≤ min{ns, r}.
2.2 System model
In [HHW20], it is assumed that a single server stores m large files X1, . . . ,Xm of the same
size. In particular, for each i ∈ [1,m] the symbols of the i-th file are arranged in a matrix
Xi ∈ F
L×(s−v)(n−k)
q , for some L ≥ 1. For convenience, we denote δ := (s − v)(n − k). Notice
that integers m, s, v, n, k, q, L are known to both the user and the server.
2.3 Queries
We here assume that the user wants to retrieve a specific file Xi, for a given i ∈ [1,m]. In order
to generate a corresponding query Qi, the user samples uniformly at random:
– a code C ⊆ Fnqs of dimension k,
– a information set I ⊂ [1, n] for C,
– a basis {γ1, . . . , γs} of Fqs over Fq, and sets V := 〈γ1, . . . , γv〉Fq and W := 〈γv+1, . . . , γs〉Fq ,
– a matrix D ∈ Fmδ×nqs such that each row of D is a codeword in C,
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Figure 1: Illustration of query matrix Qi for a random decomposition Fqs = V ⊕W . The region
filled uniformly in gray represents elements in Fqs ; the blue hashed region refers to elements in
V ; the red dotted region contains elements in W .
– a matrix E ∈ V mδ×n such that the j-th column of E is zero if j ∈ I , and lies in V mδ
otherwise,
– a matrix Zi ∈Wmδ×n such that the submatrix
Zi
[iδ+1,(i+1)δ]×I
∈W δ×(n−k)
has rank δ over Fq, and such that all remaining entries of Z are zeroes.
Eventually, the user sends Qi := D+E +Zi ∈ Fmδ×nqs to the server as a query. See Figure 1 for
an illustration.
2.4 Response
The server computes and sends back the result of the matrix product Ai = [X1, . . . ,Xm] ·Qi ∈
F
L×n
qs to the user.
2.5 Decoding
Let us decompose the matrix Qi ∈ Fmδ×nqs as a stack of m submatrices Q
i
1, . . . ,Q
i
m ∈ F
δ×n
qs . One
can proceed similarly for D, E and Zi. Then we have:
Ai =
m∑
r=1
Xr ·Qir =
m∑
r=1
Xr ·Dr +
m∑
r=1
Xr · (Er +Z
i
r) .
The rows of matrix
∑m
r=1X
r ·Dr all lie in C. By inverting a linear system on the information
set I , the user can thus recover
Y = Ai −
m∑
r=1
Xr ·Dr =
m∑
r=1
Xr · (Er +Z
i
r) =
(
m∑
r=1
Xr ·Er
)
+Xi ·∆
where ∆ := Zi[iδ+1,(i+1)δ]×[1,n].
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It remains to notice that, for a given basisW ofW , we have ψW(Y ) = Xi ·∆. Since rkFq(∆) = δ,
the user can eventually retrieve Xi from Xi ·∆.
3 An efficient attack based on the Fq-rank of submatrices
3.1 Presentation of the attack
Informally, the attack relies on the following observation: for a large enough number of files and
with high probability, the Fq-rank of D + E is much lower than the rank of Qi. Hence, if we
denote Qi[j] the submatrix of Qi obtained after deletion of rows [jδ + 1, (j + 1)δ], then one can
easily distinguish between the two following cases:
1. Qi[i] (in which case the only non-zero component ∆ of Zi has been removed), and
2. Qi[j] for j ∈ [1,m] \ {i} (in which case the component ∆ still remains).
Let us first prove a first result concerning the structure of the matrix Qi over Fq.
Proposition 3.1. Let Fqs = V ⊕W , C ⊆ F
n
qs and I be chosen as in Section 2. Then, we have
the following decomposition of Fnqs into Fq-linear spaces:
C ⊕ φI(V
n−k)⊕ φI(W
n−k) = Fnqs .
Moreover, any query Qi = D +E +Zi satisfies:
〈D〉Fq ⊆ C, 〈E〉Fq ⊆ φI(V
n−k) , and 〈Zi〉Fq ⊆ φI(W
n−k) .
Proof. The set I ⊂ [1, n] is an information set for C ⊆ Fnqs , hence it holds C ⊕φI(F
n−k
q ) = F
n
qs as
Fqs-linear spaces. This equality holds a fortiori as Fq-linear spaces. We also have V ⊕W = Fqs ,
and since φI is Fq-linear, it follows that C ⊕ φI(V
n−k)⊕ φI(W
n−k) = Fnqs .
One can now notice that Zi[i] = 0, hence Qi[i] = D[i] + E[i]. As a corollary, observe that the
rank of Qi[i] is remarkably low.
Corollary 3.2. Let us denote k0 := ks + v(n − k) = sn − δ. For every i ∈ [1,m], we have
rkFq(Q
i[i]) ≤ k0.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the fact that dimFq(C) = ks and dimFq (V
n−k) = v(n −
k).
Let us now characterize the rank of Qi[j] for j ∈ [1,m] \ {i}. Due to Proposition 3.1, we have
rkFq(Q
i[j]) = rkFq (D[j] +E[j]) + rkFq(Z
i[j]) = rkFq(D[j] +E[j]) + δ
since matrix ∆ has rank δ over Fq, by construction.
Hence, it remains to compute the probability that rkFq(D[j] +E[j]) does not shrink too much
to enable an attacker to distinguish between rkFq(Q
i[j]) and rkFq(Q
i[i]).
For a ≤ b, let us denote [
b
a
]
q
:=
(qb − 1)(qb − q) · · · (qb − qa−1)
(qa − 1)(qa − q) · · · (qa − qa−1)
the Gaussian, or q-binomial, coefficient which counts the number of Fq-linear spaces of dimension
a contained in a fixed b-dimensional linear space over Fq.
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Proposition 3.3. Let Qi = D + E + Zi be a query generated as in Section 2. Let also j 6= i
and k0 = sn− δ. Then we have:
Pr
(
rkFq(D[j] +E[j]) ≤ k0 − δ
)
≤
[
k0
k0 − δ
]
q
· q−δ
2(m−1) ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the query generation.
Proof. Let us denote U := C ⊕ φI(V
n−k) and recall that U is a Fq-linear space of dimension k0.
During the generation of the query Qi, each row of D + E is actually a vector from U picked
uniformly at random. Hence, the probability we aim at bounding is exactly
p := Pr
(
∃A ⊂ U ,dimFq(A) = k0 − δ | ∀y ∈ Rows(D[j] +E[j]),y ∈ A
)
,
where Rows(D[j] +E[j]) represents the set of rows of D[j] +E[j], seen as vectors of length ns
over Fq. Let us denote GrU (k0 − δ) the set of subspaces of dimension k0 − δ included in U . By
union bound we get
p ≤
∑
A∈GrU (k0−δ)
Pr
(
∀y ∈ Rows(D[j] +E[j]),y ∈ A
)
.
Rows y ∈ Rows(D[j] + E[j]) are vectors picked uniformly and independently in U . Thus, this
yields
p ≤
∑
A∈GrU (k0−δ)

(m−1)δ∏
t=1
Pr(y ∈ A | y ← U)


Note that GrU (k0 − δ) has cardinality
[
k0
k0−δ
]
q
. Hence,
p ≤
[
k0
k0 − δ
]
q
·
(m−1)δ∏
t=1
q−δ =
[
k0
k0 − δ
]
q
· q−δ
2(m−1) .
Notice that a rough upper bound for the Gaussian coefficient
[
k0
k0−δ
]
q
is q(δ+1)(k0−δ). Hence, the
upper bound given in Proposition 3.3 is meaningful as soon as (δ+1)(k0−δ) ≤ δ2(m−1). Thus,
let us define
m0 := 1 +
⌈
(δ + 1)(k0 − δ)
δ2
⌉
= 1 +
⌈(
1 +
1
δ
)(sn
δ
− 2
)⌉
.
We can now state the main result of the paper. The polynomial time algorithm we propose as
an attack to the cPIR scheme is given as a proof of our main theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Let Qi = D+E+Zi ∈ Fmδ×nqs be a query generated as in Section 2, and assume
that m ≥ m0 = 1 + ⌈
(δ+1)(k0−δ)
δ2
⌉. There exists an algorithm running in O(m2(sn)3) operations
over Fq, which recovers the index i when given as input Q
i with probability at least
1− q−(m−m0)δ
2
,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the query generation.
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Proof. The algorithm consists in the following. Given the query Qi, first compute the Fq-rank
of submatrices Qi[j] ∈ F(m−1)δ×nqs for every j ∈ [1,m]. Then, output the index j
∗ ∈ [1,m] (if
unique) such that rkFq(Q
i[j∗]) ≤ k0. Notice that the Fq-rank of matrices can be computed with
any basis of Fqm/Fq, and thus, independently of the knowledge of the basis {γ1, . . . , γs} chosen
by the user.
From Corollary 3.2, we indeed have rkFq(Q
i[i]) ≤ k0. Moreover, from Proposition 3.3 and the
discussion above, the probability that rkFq (Q
i[j]) ≤ k0 for some j 6= i is upper bounded by[
k0
k0 − δ
]
q
· q−δ
2(m−1) ≤ q−(m−m0)δ
2+(δ+1)(sn−2δ)−(m0−1)δ2 ≤ q−(m−m0)δ
2
,
by definition of m0.
The running time of the algorithm is in O(m2(sn)3) since it consists in computing m times the
Fq-rank of a matrix of size (m− 1)δ × n over Fqs , where δ ≤ sn.
3.2 Discussion
In this paragraph, we discuss the necessary condition m ≥ m0 for the attack to work. We
show that this condition is fulfilled for any relevant parameter of the system. More specifically,
Theorem 3.4 proposes an efficient attack against the cPIR system from [HHW20] if the number
m of files stored by the server is at least m0 = 1 + ⌈(1 + 1δ )(
sn
δ
− 2)⌉. In particular, this cPIR
system cannot support an unbounded number of files.
Let us discuss the efficiency of the PIR scheme in the converse case. Recall that the PIR rate
of a PIR system is the ratio between the bit size of the desired file and the total communication
complexity. The PIR rate corresponding to the trivial PIR protocol is equal to 1/m. A common
assumption for cPIR schemes is to treat the query size as negligible compared to the size of the
stored files. For the considered cPIR scheme, this boils down to assuming that L ≫ sn. The
PIR rate may then be approximated as the ratio of the size of a file over the number of bits
downloaded in the retrieval protocol. In any case, the bandwidth required for the download
of the entire database gives an upper bound on the cost one is willing to afford in terms of
communication. However, if m < m0, it turns out that the PIR rate of that cPIR system drops
close to the rate of the trivial PIR protocol, as we show next.
In [HHW20], the authors prove that for large files, i.e. L≫ δm, we have
RPIR ≃
δ
sn
.
Hence, if m < m0, we get:
m− 1 .
(
1 +
1
δ
)(
1
RPIR
− 2
)
,
and it follows that
RPIR .
1 + 1
δ
m+ 1 + 2
δ
.
Thus, for m < m0 the PIR rate is bounded by 2m+3 . Moreover, for large values of δ, one gets
RPIR = O
(
1
m
(1 + 1
δ
)
)
, i.e. in this context the protocol is not significantly better than the trivial
entire download of the database.
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